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ASYMMETRICAL CAUSATION AND
CRIMINAL DESISTANCE
CHRISTOPHER UGGEN* AND IRVING PILIAVIN"
Although criminologists have long been concerned with de-
sistance or cessation from crime,' tests of theory are typically
based on etiological investigations.2 Desistance studies, in con-
trast, have historically been used for program evaluations, un-
dertaken by professionals in social work, clinical psychology,
and corrections. We argue that theory and research on desis-
tance is absolutely critical to advancing scientific and policy
goals. We do not attempt to break new theoretical or empirical
ground in this paper, but instead present a systematic explica-
tion of the argument for desistance research.
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I. CAUSAL ASYMMETRY, CRIME, AND DESISTANCE
A. THE GROWING UNIVERSE OF POTENTIAL DESISTERS
Though ex-offenders are socially marginalized in America,
they are no longer a statistically marginal group. As of Decem-
ber 31, 1997, American state and federal prisons held 1,244,554
prisoners, with over 500,000 additional inmates held in local
jails.3 Despite recent increases in mandatory minimum and
mandatory life sentences, almost all of these prisoners will even-
tually rejoin civil society.4 Each year, several hundred thousand
releasees pour into the general population, with over 400,000
entering parole in 1997.5 In fact, over the past twenty-five years
the trends in prison release closely mirror rising incarceration
rates. Figure 1 plots the number of U.S. prisoners incarcerated
and the number of prisoners released each year. As the figure
indicates, the two data series are correlated quite closely (r=.98).
In fact, more prisoners were released in 1996 than were incar-
cerated in 1986 and more than twice as many were released in
1996 as were incarcerated in 1976. Some of these released pris-
oners will resume crime and others will desist from crime-they
will temporarily or permanently cease offending--yet little is
known about the desistance process. This paper argues that a
research program to identify the causes of desistance will ad-
vance both scientific and policy concerns.
Despite a longstanding concern within the discipline,
criminologists today devote relatively little attention to deriving
theoretical understanding of the desistance process. This is be-
cause criminological theory and research are primarily con-
cerned with questions of etiology, or the causes of crime.
Darrell K. Gilliard & Allen J. Beck, Prisoners in 1997, in BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTIcS BULLETIN 1 (1998).
4 JOHN IRWIN &JAMES AUSTIN, IT'S ABOUT TIME: AMERICA'S IMPRISONMENT BINGE 161
(2d ed. 1997).
THoMAs P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PROBATION AND PAROLE POPULATIONS
4 (1998).
6The data in Figure 1 are taken from SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS
1995, at 560 (1996) published by the U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice
Statistics for the years 1973-1996. These data may also be found in the Bureau ofJus-
tice Statistics series CORRECIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 76 (1996).
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UGGEN & PILIA VIN
Discipline-based criminologists such as sociologists, psycholo-
gists, and economists have focused their attention on etiological
research addressing individual involvement in crime or com-
munity crime rates. Unfortunately, the study of these phenom-
ena is conceptually complex, fraught with daunting
methodological barriers, and in many (though not all) ways,
without policy relevance. Desistance research may prove more
rewarding for theory and policy, in part because it is more man-
ageable conceptually and methodologically.
In this paper, we are less concerned with why people com-
mit crime than with the conditions promoting social reintegra-
tion and desistance from crime. We make the following
assertions: (1) that the causes of desistance likely differ from the
causes of crime; (2) that knowledge of the true causes of desis-
tance will be easier to obtain than knowledge of the true causes
of crime; and (3) that it will be possible to translate scientific
knowledge about desistance into specific policy interventions.
We begin with a general discussion of crime and causality, then
present the case for and against desistance research.
B. CRIMINOLOGICAL PROBLEMS POSED BY THE RUBIN/HOLLAND
CAUSAL MODEL
As social scientists researching crime and conformity, we of-
ten set out to make causal inferences. Temporal order, statisti-
cal association, and lack of spuriousness are generally accepted
as minimal criteria for establishing causality in the social sci-
ences,7 though these standards are rarely approached in prac-
tice. In the study of delinquency, for example, we continue to
debate the putative causes: are delinquent friends causes or
consequences of involvement in crime? Does family alienation
precede or follow from one's involvement with delinquent
peers? Definitive answers to such questions are elusive because
of both conceptual confusion over the meaning of causality and
7 See Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Foreword to HERBERT HYMAN, SURVEY DESIGN AND ANALYSIS at
xiv (1955); TRAVIS HIRSCHI & HANAN C. SELVIN, DELINQUENCY RESEARCH: AN APPRAISAL
OF ANALYTiC METHODS 52-53 (1967); but see Margaret Mooney Marini & Burton Singer,
Causality in the Social Sciences, in Soc. METHODOLOGY 347, 376-79 (Clifford C. Clogg
ed., 1988); and Huw Price, Agency and Causal Asymmetry, 101 MIND 501, 511 (1992), on
temporal order.
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operational difficulties implementing critical tests of theoretical
propositions.
Rubin8 and Holland offer a statistical model of causal infer-
ence that lays. bare the obstacles to establishing causation in
criminology. The Rubin/Holland model highlights the difficul-
ties in establishing the causes of crime and illustrates the poten-
tial for desistance research. The central prescription of the
model is to seek the effects of manipulable causes rather than to
trace the causes of observed effects. They arrive at this conclu-
sion in the following manner:
Holland defines a true causal effect of some factor T on re-
sponse variable Y for individual unit U as
Y,(U) -Y,.(u)l°
This difference implies that the effect of any cause T must
always be assessed in relation to some other cause, the counter-
factual condition not-T or C. The fundamental problem of
causal inference, in criminological research as elsewhere, is that
it is impossible to observe the value of Y,(U) and Y(u) on the
same individual person or "unit." If a respondent is employed
at age fifteen and commits delinquency at age sixteen, for ex-
ample, we cannot determine whether she would have committed
delinquency had she not been working. Because we can only
observe one condition per unit, we face a missing data problem
for the counter-factual condition. Holland distinguishes be-
tween scientific and statistical solutions to this problem. Both
have been applied in criminological research.
1. Scientiflc Solutions
Among the scientific solutions, one can attempt to assure
(or simply assume) that each individual unit is identical (assum-
ing unit homogeneity) and submit unit one to treatment T and
' Donald B. Rubin, Estimating Causual Effects of Treatments in Randomized and Non-
randomized Studies, 66J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 688, 689-90 (1974).
' Paul W. Holland, Statistics and Causal Inference, 81 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 945, 946
(1986).
'o Id, at 947.
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unit two to treatment C. If so, then the true causal effect is eas-
ily obtained as:
YI(U,) - Y,(u2)
Alternatively, if it is reasonable to believe that prior expo-
sure does not affect subsequent response, the scientist could
expose the same unit to each treatment in succession (assuming
temporal stability and causal transience).
YT(TE2) (U) - YC(TIIE, (U,)
Although such assumptions may be reasonable in laboratory
work, they are rarely justified in criminological research: hu-
mans are not identical in all relevant respects, and human re-
sponses are neither constant over time nor unaffected by
previous exposures. To continue the previous example, we
cannot assume that a working teen is identical in all relevant re-
spects to a non-working teen, for workers may be more ambi-
tious, less impulsive, or more opportunistic than non-workers.
Nor can we assume that exposure to work in eighth grade will
have the same effects as exposure to work in tenth grade, or, for
that matter, that working in eighth grade will not affect one's
response to non-work in tenth grade. Therefore, as social scien-
tists we must often rely on a statistical solution to the inference
problem.
2. Statistical Solutions
The Rubin/Holland statistical solution is to find the ex-
pected value (E) of the average causal effect T, of T (relative to
C) over a population U, or
E (Y, -Y) =T
which can be expressed as
T = E(Y) - E(Y,)
1404 [Vol. 88
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To continue the earlier example, one could deviate the av-
erage number of crimes (or the proportion committing a
crime) among workers from the average number of crimes
among non-workers. This replaces the unobservable causal ef-
fect of T on a specific unit with an estimate of the average causal
effect of T over a population of units. Unfortunately, this ap-
proach breaks down in practice because an important assump-
tion is unlikely to hold.
3. The Mean Independence Assumption
For the statistical solution to hold, we must assume mean in-
dependence the mean values on Y for the T group and the C
group must be independent of the selection or assignment
mechanism (S) that determines whether YT or Y, is observed for
any given unit. In general, mean independence fails in crimi-
nology and other social sciences and the observed average
treatment effect T(0o) is not equivalent to the true treatment ef-
fect T n"
TWO = E(YTIS=T) - E(YcIS=c)
The mean independence assumption for groups is thus
analogous to the unit homogeneity assumption for units. Both
allow the comparison of observed quantities with latent or un-
observed quantities. Only when Y, and Y, are both mean inde-
pendent of S, however, does
E(Y,) = E(YTIS=T) and E(Y,) = E(Y=IS=c)
So that
T=T O) = E (Y) - E(Y)
In short, the two conditional means E(YIS=T) and E
(YIS=c) must be independent for them both to equal the un-
" Holland distinguishes between a "prima facie" cause T, and the true average
causal effect T. Id. at 949.
1998] 1405
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conditional mean E(YT)12 If the selection mechanism S is ran-
domized assignment to employment, this is a reasonable as-
sumption for the work and crime example above. If S is self-
selection, however, this assumption is invalid: those that self-
select into employment are likely to have lower crime means
than those that self-select out of employment. If selection is
partially determined by "ambition" and ambition is associated
with crime, for example, the conditional distributions are une-
qual and the mean independence assumption breaks down.
This is simply one important variant of the more general omit-
ted variable problem that biases parameter estimates. Crimi-
nology is particularly vulnerable to violations of mean
independence, however, because the selection processes into
levels of our independent and dependent variables are so poorly
understood.
2 This point becomes clear when expressed in terms of conditional probabilities.
The expected value for the treatment group is composed of two parts, the mean if as-
signed to treatment and the mean if assigned to control. The first quantity is the
product of the expected value of the mean for the treatment group and the probabil-
ity of selection into that group. The second quantity is the unobserved mean for the
counterfactual (the mean the controls would have had, were they assigned to treat-
ment) multiplied by the probability of selection into the counterfactual, or control
status.
E(Y,) = E(YTIS=T)P(S=T) + E(YTS=C)P(S=c)
Similarly, the expected value for the control group is:
E(Y=) = E(YcIS=c)P(S=c) + E(YJS=T)P(S=T)
The expected values for both treatment and control groups are thus weighted av-
erages of the observed and counterfactual conditions. By substituting these quantities
into the expression T = E(Y) - E(Y¢), we obtain
T = E(YjIS=T)P(S=T) + [E(YTIS=c)P(S=c)] - E(Y=jS=c)P(S=c) - [E(Y¢IS=T)P(S=T)]
Of course, we only observe Y when a unit selects into the treatment condition and
we only observe Y when a unit selects into the control condition, computing T(..) as
follows:
Tom) = E(YTIS=T) - E(YJIS=c)
To determine the true rather than the observed causal effect, we need information
about the unknown (and unknowable) counterfactual conditions. If the mean of Y is
independent of the assignment mechanism S, however, then
E(YIS=T) = E(YJS=C) = E(Y) and E(YIS=C) = E(YjIS=T) = E(Y)
so that
T = To),= E(YT,) - E(Y)
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4. Selection Mechanisms and Strong Ignorability.
When researchers cannot control the assignment mecha-
nism (S), as in observational studies of delinquency, causal in-
ference requires "strong ignorability" to assure mean
independence. 13 For a selection mechanism to be strongly ig-
norable: (1) all factors related to both the treatment and non-
treatment condition must be included as covariates; (2) all units
must have a non-zero probability of assignment to treatment
and non-treatment conditions; and (3) a unit's response to
treatment must not be affected by either the assignment
14
mechanism or the treatments other units receive. These con-
ditions require much more exhaustive data and much more
painstaking analysis than are usually conducted in etiological
studies of crime and delinquency. Each variable of causal inter-
est must be fastidiously examined. In the example above, we
would have to pay at least as much attention to the process by
which young people find jobs as we would to the effects of jobs
on crime. We would also need theory and data regarding fac-
tors such as peer associates, success or failure in school, parental
supervision, and myriad other indicators likely to be related to
both processes. In sum, Berk's contention that strong ignorabil-
ity may be a "pipe dream" in observational research is particu-
15larly true for the study of crime.
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORYAND POLICY ON CRIME
To determine causality, then, the model requires at mini-
mum a random or strongly ignorable assignment mechanism
and treatments that can (at least in principle) be manipulated.
We argue that these conditions are unlikely to hold in etiologi-
cal research on crime. In desistance analysis, however, both
random selection mechanisms and manipulable interventions
are much more feasible: a researcher can randomly assign to (or
deny from) offenders a range of treatment modalities-a range
" Paul R. Rosenbaum & Donald B. Rubin, Reducing Bias in Observation Studies Using
Subclassification on the Propensity Score, 79J. AM. STAT. ASS'N. 516, 522 (1984).
4 Richard A. Berk, Causal Inference for Sociological Data, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIOLOGY
155, 161 (NeilJ. Smelser ed., 1988).
'5 Id. at 165.
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of putative causes. She then can observe the effects of these
causes relative to some other cause, presumably assignment to a
control condition.
A. DISADVANTAGES OF NON-EXPERIMENTAL ETIOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
In nonexperimental social research, we typically attempt to
assure mean independence using covariate adjustment for fac-
tors likely to be related to both the putative cause and the selec-
don process. As Sobel points out, if researchers can "name and
measure the covariates that account for assignment" to a condi-
tion, then its conditional average effects are estimable from the
data.16 Unfortunately, we often do not know which factors must
be statistically controlled to render the selection mechanism
strongly ignorable. Even when we can identify such variables,
they are subject to measurement error. Until we have much
more refined conceptual models of selection into our independ-
ent variables, a safer alternative is to manipulate them as part of
the research design.
As regards the dependent variables, there remains confusion
over the appropriate domain of behavior in etiological research:
how do we compare studies of involvement in minor crime with
those investigating more serious, sustained, or socially harmful
criminal behavior? How can we make causal interpretations
when studies fail to distinguish entrance from continuation in
crime, particularly since entrance appears to be virtually univer-
sal? The primary problem is one of endogeneity--isolating the
true effects of factors that cannot be manipulated by the re-
searcher.
1. Accounting for Selection
How can criminologists account for the selection mecha-
nism and make causal interpretations when etiological studies
of crime are beset by endogeneity? Perhaps the most promising
" Michael E. Sobel, An Introduction to Causal Inference, 24 SoC. METHODS &
RESEARcH 353, 367 (1996).
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approach is to examine within-person changes in offending.
Still, even models that purport to control for individual differ-
ences can only account for stable within-unit differences. For
example, it is common in econometrics to adjust for unobserved
heterogeneity in pooled time-series analysis with fixed-effects
models in which each variable is expressed as a deviation from
its mean value. Unfortunately, such estimators are inappropri-
ate when crime is not exogenously determined or a reciprocal
causal relationship is suspected. 8 If the past level of the de-
pendent variable (crime) has a causal effect on subsequent lev-
els of the independent variable (employment), this violates the
assumption of "strict exogeneity."' 9 Therefore, although good
longitudinal data and analytic techniques enable researchers to
statistically control for unmeasured stable differences, these
models only correct for selectivity and omitted variable biases to
the extent that the relevant unobservables are person-specific
and fixed over time. Ethnographic and interview data, however,
suggest that this assumption may be mistaken: offenders' per-
ceptions and normative orientations evolve with age and life-
course transitions, as does the social and historical context in
which they find themselves. 0
2. Manipulable Treatments
Although etiological studies have led to elegant tests of
criminological theory,21 their implications suggest interventions
that are often unworkable for public policy. Neither the re-
17 SeeJulie Homey et al., Criminal Careers in the Short-term: Intra-Individual Variability
in Crime and its Relation to Local Life Circumstances, 60 AM. Soc. REV. 655, 657 (1995).
,
8David R. Johnson, Alternative Methods for the Quantitative Analysis of Panel Data in
Family Research: Pooled Time-Series Models, 57J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1065, 1071 (1994).
," Id.; see also Michael P. Keane & David E. Runkle, On the Estimation of Panel-Data
Models With Serial Correlation When Instruments Are Not Strictly Exogenous, 10 J. Bus. &
ECON. STAT. 1, 3 (1992).
20 See NFiL SHOVER, GREAT PRETENDERS: PURSUITS AND CAREERS OF PERSISTENT
THIEVES 124 (1996).
2"See e.g., John Hagan et al., Class in the Household: A Power-Control Theory of Gender
and Delinquency, 92 AM.J. oF Soc. 788 (1987); Allen E. Liska & Mark D. Reed, Ties to
Conventional Institutions and Delinquency: Estimating Reciprocal Effects, 50 AM. SOC. REV.
547 (1985); Ross L. Matsueda, Testing Control Theoy and Differential Association: A
Causal Modeling Approach, 47 AM. Soc. REV. 489 (1982).
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searcher nor the state has the ethical or constitutional license to
radically alter, say, the personality, parental background, neigh-
borhood, or associates of youth identified as "pre-delinquent
22
who have yet to violate the law. In light of these problems, pro-
grams aiming to prevent the onset of delinquency have been
excoriated in the evaluation literature. 3 There are few strong
treatments that a researcher can administer in good conscience,
leaving little room for bold experimentation among such a vul-
nerable population. Even well-intentioned efforts to increase
opportunities for youth in high-risk groups may have unin-
24tended stigmatizing or otherwise deleterious consequences.
3. Causal Asymmety
Etiological research has provided many well-established
empirical generalizations, such as the relation between law vio-
lation and gender, age, urban residence, mobility, parental at-
tachment, school success, and moral beliefs. 5 Unfortunately,
these findings do not translate neatly into a set of causal maxims
or concrete policy prescriptions to prevent the onset of delin-
quency or crime. Moreover, we have little reason to believe that
manipulating these factors will alter offending behavior once it
has begun. The failure of programs as wide-ranging as family
therapy, remedial education, reference group alteration, and
psychological counseling suggests that either the presumed
cause is misidentified or that symmetrical causation does not
apply. Of course, the failure of particular policies does not rule
out the possibility that more intensive, more costly, more fo-
SHELDON GLUECK & ELEANOR T. GLUECK, IDENTIFICATION OF PREDELINQUENTS:
VALIDATION STUDIES AND SOME SUGGESTED USES OF THE GLUECK TABLE 1, 9 (Sheldon
Glueck & Eleanor T. Glueck eds., 1972).
One otherwise evenhanded review of programs to prevent or control delinquency
concludes that "Prevention projects don't work and they waste money, violate the rights
ofjuveniles and their families, inspire bizarre suggestions and programs, and fail to affect
the known correlates of urban delinquency." RICHARD J. LUNDMAN, PREVENTION AND
CONTROL OFJUVENLE DELINQUENCY 245 (1993).
24 See HOwARD BECKER, OUTSIDERS 35 (1963); LARRY L. ORR ET AL., DOES TRAINING
FOR THE DISADVANTAGED WORK? 131-33 (1996).
2 For reviews of this literature see JOHN BRAIrHwAITE, CRIME, SHAME, AND
REINTEGRATION 54-97 (1989); MICHAEL GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL
THEORY OF CRIME 123-53 (1990); JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARDJ. HERNSTEIN, CRIME AND
HUMAN NATURE (1985).
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cused, or more invasive treatments may indeed have the in-
tended prophylactic result. Therefore, we must continue seek-
ing innovative and creative policy interventions. This paper
argues, however, that we must simultaneously begin a more sys-
tematic investigation of the causes of desistance.
4. Manipulating Initial Conditions
We currently lack the information to determine whether the
causes of crime and desistance are symmetrical. The situation is
analogous to the apparent temporal asymmetry in radiative
phenomena observed by Popper: we understand why a stone
tossed into a still pond will produce outgoing concentric waves
on the water's surface, and yet it would strike us as remarkable
to witness a confluence of incoming concentric waves arriving at
just the right moment to launch a stone out of the pond and
into one's hand.26 This could signal some asymmetry in the laws
of thermodynamics or it could simply reflect our relative capac-
ity to manipulate the initial conditions that give rise to each
phenomenon. That is, in the existing world it is much easier to
toss a rock into a pond than to engineer the sort of elaborate
27experiment necessary to reverse the process. For the study of
crime and desistance, the situation is analogous: as we argue be-
low, the conditions likely to engender desistance are much
more amenable to manipulation than the conditions likely to
cause crime.
B. ADVANTAGES OF DESISTANCE ANALYSIS
Desistance studies-of drug use, welfare receipt, retirement,
and other phenomena in addition to crime-are much better
situated to guide social policy than etiological studies. The pri-
mary advantage of desistance analysis stems from the ability to
randomly assign a target group to a truly exogenous treatment.
Experimental evaluations examining desistance or recidivism
outcomes may provide results that directly translate into policy
See Karl R. Popper, The Arrow of Time, 177 NATURE 538 (1956).
27 See Price, supra note 7, at 504-05.
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231prescriptions. Moreover, when interventions are tightly linked
to theory, desistance analysis can provide the sort of critical tests
of criminological theory that have eluded etiological research-
ers.
1. Temporal Order
Why is this best accomplished in a study of desistance? First,
and perhaps most importantly, the desistance researcher works
in concert with time rather than against it. Although twentieth-
century physics have challenged traditional conceptions of tem-
poral order in causality,2 the arrow of causation typically re-
mains aligned with the arrow of time in the social sciences. In
terms of the Rubin/Holland model, desistance research seeks
the effects of manipulable causes-interventions in the hands of
the researcher-rather than seeking to reconstruct the putative
causes of observed effects. Too often, criminological research-
ers attempt to enumerate all possible causes of crime in a fruit-
less attempt to statistically deconstruct naturally occurring
assignment mechanisms. By "controlling for" myriad causes, the
argument goes, researchers hope to render selection strongly
ignorable and get clean estimates of all of them. Instead, we be-
lieve with Holland ° and Sobe13' that we should carefully exam-
ine the effect of particular causes by consciously manipulating
them.
2. A License to Intervene
The difficulties in etiological research are a matter of both
logical and pragmatic considerations-of both causal sequenc-
ing and the authority to act. Where and how (and when) can we
best craft and apply an intervention so that we may examine its
consequences? Our ability to isolate the true causal effect of
critical etiological factors such as parents, schools, and neigh-
28 PETER H. RossI ET AL., MONEY, WORK, AND CRIME: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 277
(1980); JUDITH M. GUERON & EDWARD PAULY, FROM WELFARE TO WORK 29 (1991); ORR
ETAL., supra note 24, at 211.
Price, supra note 7, at 512.
Holland, supra note 9, at 959 (1986).
Sobel, supra note 16, at 373.
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borhoods is constrained by our inability to manipulate the selec-
tion mechanisms guiding their allocation. For both social scien-
tific research and for policy purposes, manipulation of these
factors is unacceptably invasive in a democratic society. The re-
searcher conducting a desistance study has a more legitimate
and expansive license to intervene in the lives of participants. This
means that she can provide, or perhaps more importantly, deny
a particular program to a treatment and a control group. Of
course constitutional and ethical concerns do not disappear in
desistance programs; some inmates may be falsely accused and
imprisoned, the victims of an imperfect criminal justice system.
Nevertheless, participants have all been convicted of crimes, or
in the case of juveniles, adjudicated delinquent. We may cer-
tainly provide or deny employment, for example. Although we
do not advocate random assignment to marriage, we can cer-
tainly manipulate causal interventions that are designed to en-
hance marital quality or stability through financial,
psychological, or behavioral counseling and support.
3. Target Efficiency
Finally, desistance strategies are better able to concentrate
resources on specific target groups likely to benefit from them.
Primary prevention programs, in contrast, must cast a much
wider net that is liable to include a large number of non-
offenders (or offenders who commit only trivial offenses). For
policy, this means that programs designed to foster desistance
may bring a greater return to investments in released offend-
ers--a greater potential to reduce the social harm associated
with recidivism. For science, this means that desistance analysis
offers potentially greater efficiencies in design and statistical
analysis.
C. REAL AND IMAGINED DISADVANTAGES OF DESISTANCE ANALYSIS
1. Devising Theoretically Relevant Interventions
In our view, the major weakness in existing desistance re-
search has been the lack of theoretically derived interventions.
Typically researchers assess the effects of a program, such as ju-
1998] 1413
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venile probation, without sufficient attention to the mechanisms
thought to link that program with criminal behavior. Such a
program could be based on deterrence theory, in which super-
vision and sanctions play a large role. Alternatively, it could be
based on modeling or learning theory, in which the affective
ties between the caseworker and the probationer are empha-
sized. Moreover, policymakers and practitioners generally pre-
fer to individualize rather than standardize treatments-to do
whatever appears to work without regard to theory. 2 The result
of such interventions is often uninterpretable. It is also difficult,
though not impossible, to make valid inferences about the ef-
fects of mediating social-psychological processes that occur after
randomization.5 Despite these barriers, it is certainly possible
to structure theoretically derived interventions and to distin-
guish between such disparate theories as those found in the la-
beling, deterrence, differential association, and social control
traditions.
2. External Validity
The primary weakness of previous desistance analyses for
policy purposes has been external validity or generalizability.
Many interventions and evaluations have been based on pilot
programs that drew subjects from rather narrow officially-
defined offender subgroups, such as heroin users in New York
City.34 Nevertheless, this difficulty is neither unique to nor in-
herent in investigations of desistance. A well-designed employ-
ment program and a long-term follow-up on a national
probability sample of prison releasees, for example, would cer-
tainly constitute a viable research project. The results of this
type of study would generalize to a broad population of interest
and could offer specific policy recommendations.
3' DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 43-81 (1980).
"Sobel, suPra note 16, at 373.
s4 Lucy FRIEDMAN, U.S. DEP'T. HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, THE WILDCAT
EXPERIMENT: AN EARLY TEST OF SUPPORTED WORK IN DRUG ABUSE REHABILITATION
(1978).
1414 [Vol. 88
CAUSATION & CRIMINAL DESISTANCE
3. Secret Deviance
The desistance researcher must typically rely on officially-
defined deviant populations. Yet prison populations clearly
represent a subset of all law violators and the desistance process
may differ for those who have never been formally labeled. One
might speculate, for example, that the effects of adult social
bonds to work and family differ among those formally labeled in
comparison to those not stigmatized by official deviant status.
III. PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE DESISTANCE ANALYSIS
A. EARLY DESISTANCE MODELS
We are not the first to make these points: criminologists
have long suspected that the causes of crime and the causes of
desistance may be asymmetrical. In tracing the history of theory
and research on desistance, the first task is to arrive at a mean-
ingful definition. The concept has a long lineage in criminol-
ogy, though few theorists or researchers used the term until the
1970s.35 Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck spoke of "maturation,"
"cessation," or "reformation" as a process quite different from
the genesis of delinquency or criminality.36 Sutherland used the
term "reformation" as well, 3 7 both- as a putative justification for
punishment and as a constructive process of character reor-
ganization. 9 The latter process, Sutherland argued, could be
explained by his differential association theory of crime and his
group conflict theory of the criminal code. Reformation for
Sutherland results when the offender assimilates the values and
culture of the group responsible for the laws, or when that
group "assimilates the criminal. 40
Though David Matza's theory of delinquency and drift41 was
never intended to explain the behavior of the "compulsive or
MARVIN WOLFGANG ET AL., DEJNQUENCYIN ABIRTH COHORT 44 (1972).
GLUEcK & GLUECK, 500 CRIMINAL CAREERS, supra note 1, at 257; GLUECK &
GLUECK, LATER CRIMINAL CAREERS, supra note 1, at 98, 106.
7 SUTERLAND, supra note 1, at 357.
"Id.
"Id. at 36-64.
'0 Id. at 364.
4
' DAVID MATZA, DELUNQUENCYANDDRIFT 27(1964).
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committed delinquent,"42 much less the adult criminal, it pro-
vides conceptual tools that generalize to the study of desistance
among these groups.43 "Maturational reform," Matza's term for
the age-graded desistance process, connotes a life-course expla-
nation of crime and desistance." Matza's "drift" theory is
founded on an episodic view of crime: "delinquency is a status
and delinquents are incumbents who intermittently act out a
role. 45 Most delinquent youth spend long periods of time in a
state of desistance that is only occasionally punctuated by delin-
quent activities. Over time, with age and increasing work and
family responsibilities, most will eventually enter a permanent
state of desistance. 5
More recently new models of desistance have been devel-
oped based on economic choice,47 or choice plus a combination
of sociological and social-psychological indicators.48 In these
models, situational factors such as negative criminal experiences
and life events such as marriage cause offenders to re-evaluate
their readiness to commit crime. Although these theories are
usually tested with observational data, many of the mechanisms
might easily be translated into manipulable interventions such
as financial aid to releasees.
B. THE CAREER PARADIGM
Today, the concept of desistance from crime is most com-
monly associated with the study of "chronic offenders,, 49 "career
42 Id. at 30.
3 Id. at 81.
44 Id. at 22-26.
" Id. at 26.
" ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MA19NG: PATHWAYS AND
TURNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE 217-30 (1993); NEAL SHOVER, GREAT PRETENDERS 119,
125 (1996).
See Pezzin, supra note 2, at 33.
48 Ronald V. Clark & Derek B. Cornish, Modeling Offenders'Decisions: A Framework for
Research and Policy, in 6 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 147, 168
(M. Tonry & N. Morris eds., 1985); Maurice Cusson & Pierre Pinsonneault, The Deci-
sion to Give Up Crime, in THE REASONING CRIMINAL 72, 74 (D.B. Cornish & R.V. Clarke
eds., 1986); Shover & Thompson, supra note 2, at 93.
49 WOLFGANGETAL., supra note 35 at 88.
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criminals," and the criminal career perspective more generally."
The career paradigm suggests that criminal activities follow dis-
tinct patterns and introduces concepts such as age of "onset,"
"persistence," and "desistance" to describe these patterns.5 1
The career concept has provoked a rancorous debate sur-
rounding desistance. As Wolfgang et al. acknowledge, 2 and
Hirschi and Gottfredson criticize,53 the concept of desistance
appears to imply a criminal career. For Hirschi and Gottfred-
son, the term "career" connotes specialization in particular of-
fenses and escalation in offense severity over time. 4 Since
empirical research generally reveals versatility rather than spe-
cialization in offending5  and decreasing severity rather than es-
calation with age,56 Hirschi, Gottfredson, and other critics of the
paradigm argue that no new insights are gained by conceiving
of crime as a career. 7 Proponents of the career perspective, in
contrast, maintain that no escalation in seriousness or speciali-
zation is implied by the term "career" and that the predictors of
participation differ empirically from the predictors of onset and
desistance.8
This paper does not engage the criminal career debate, ex-
cept insofar as it bears on the question of symmetric causation.
If crime is conceptualized as a social event in the life course,59
desistance can be conceptualized in a number of ways: (1) as
o Alfred Blumstein et al., Criminal Career Research: Its Value for Criminology, 26
CRmINOLOGY 1, 1-36 (1988).
-" Michael Gottfredson & Travis Hirschi, Science, Public Policy, and the Career Para-
digm, 26 CRIMuNOLOGY 37, 40 (1988).
52 WOLFGANG ETAL, supra note 35, at 251.
" Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Age and the Explanation of Crime, 89 AM. J.
SocAoLorY 552-84 (1983).
Id. at 574-78.
"Michael J. Hindelang, Age, Sex, and the Versatility of Delinquent Involvements, 18
Soc. PROBS. 522, 522 (1971); Malcolm W. Klein, Offence Specialisation and Versatility
amongJuveniles, 24 BRrr.J. CRIMINOLOGY 185, 185 (1984).
SHELDON GLUECK & ELEANOR T. GLUECK, JUVENILE DELNQUENTS GRowN Up 89
(1940).
57 GOTFREDSON & HIRscmI, supra note 25, at 241 (1990).
s Alfred Blumstein et al., Longitudinal and Criminal Career Research: Further Clarifica-
tions, 26 CRIMNOLOGY 57, 60 (1988).
" John Hagan & Alberto Palloni, Crimes as Social Events in the Life Course: Reconceiv-
inga Criminological Controversy, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 87, 87-100 (1988).
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simple non-crime, a behavioral state of indeterminate duration
characterized by the absence of criminal events; (2) as non-
crime conditional on prior commission of crime (e.g. one must
first offend in order to desist); or, (3) as non-crime forever, a
more-or-less permanent behavioral state characterized by the
absence of criminal events. In this paper we have been primar-
ily concerned with the latter two conceptions of desistance.
C.. FUTURE DESISTANCE ANALYSIS
1. Randomized Experimentation
We have already learned a great deal from the few con-
trolled experiments conducted with ex-offenders, 6° though such
studies have historically examined rather circumscribed eco-
nomic questions. To unravel the causes of desistance, further
randomized experimentation for both juvenile and adult of-
fenders is crucial. We therefore conclude on a programmatic
note. We need not think of desistance programs as narrowly
limited to existing correctional practices or evaluation research
at the individual level. Desistance research can reasonably and
profitably examine a diverse range of questions at the situ-
ational, group, or even the societal level of analysis.
2. Comparative Work
Comparative research on desistance is prompted by empiri-
cal differences across nations in factors such as the relation be-
tween age and desistance. In Japan, for example, the peak age
of offending is earlier in adolescence and the decline in the late
teen years is steeper than in the United States.6 ' The rationale
for comparative analysis stems from potential American excep-
tionalism with regard to deviant behavior. The United States is
'o KENNETH J. LENIHAN, WHEN MONEY COUNTS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF
PROVIDING FINANCIAL AID AND JOB PLACEMENT SERVICES TO RELEASED PRISONERS 1
(1976); IRVING PILIAVIN & ROSEMARY GARTNER, THE IMPACT OF SUPPORTED WORK ON Ex-
OFFENDERS 132 (1981); PETER H. ROSSI ET AL., MONEY, WORK AND CRIME:
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 277-83 (Academic Press 1st ed. 1980).
61 Yutaka Harada, Adjustment to School, Life Course Transitions, and Changes in Delin-
quent Behavior in Japan, in 4 CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON AGING AND THE LIFE CYCLE 35,
37 (Z.S. Blau &John Hagan eds., 1995).
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clearly the most punitive of the advanced Western societies,62
with an incarceration rate that exceeds Germany's rate by a fac-
tor of seven andJapan's rate by a factor of sixteen.63 This creates
disproportionately large officially-defined deviant populations.
Yet the United States lacks institutional mechanisms for inte-
grating delinquents and reintegrating adult offenders into the
social and economic fabric of civil society.64, Many attribute Ja-
pan's low crime rates to cultural traditions of shaming and apol-
ogy,0 but quite apart fromJapanese culture, a more rationalized
school-to-work transition facilitates the integration of youth into
adult society.& Experimental (or quasi-experimental) pilot pro-
grams in U.S. communities that are modeled on German or
Japanese structures might better isolate their causal effects, as
well as the residual effects of enduring cultural differences.
Comparative analysis may also qualify, extend, or refine gener-
alizations based on the American case.
IV. CONCLUSION
The goal of this paper has been to examine desistance
among criminal offenders, rather than to plumb the limits of
desistance research more generally. We believe that the same
principles underlying desistance research on crime are likely to
hold true for a wide range of deviant role-exits, such as sub-
stance use, homelessness, welfare receipt, non-traditional ca-
reers, perhaps even social-physiological phenomena such as
eating disorders.
We have motivated this discussion of desistance with the
Rubin/Holland causal model to highlight the extraordinary
barriers to causal inference in etiological investigations. We be-
lieve it is virtually impossible to assure mean independence in
62 NILS CHRISTIE, CRIME CONTROL AS INDUSTRY 30-31 (Routledge 2d ed. 1994);
ELuorr CURRIE, CONFRONTING CRIME: ANAAMERICAN CHALLENGE 28-29 (1985).
' Marc Mauer, AMERICANS BEHIND BARS: THE INTERNATIONAL USE OF INCARCERATION
1995, at 4 tbl.1 (1997).
" BRAITHWAITE, supra note 25, at 179.
6' Id. at 61-65.
6James E. Rosenbaum et al., Market and Network Theories of the Transition from High
School to Work: Their Application to Industrialized Societies, 16 ANNUAL REV. OF Soc. 263,
282-85 (1990).
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observational work on the causes of crime, despite the often
brilliant methodological work-arounds devised by criminolo-
gists. If mean independence fails and we cannot account for se-
lection into levels of our most critical independent variables,
then the assumption of "strong ignorability" also fails. Under
these conditions, any statistical solution to the fundamental
problem of causal inference is unwarranted. Thus, we remain
skeptical of the findings of etiological investigations.
As an alternative, we outline a case for increased theoretical
and empirical work on the problem of cessation or desistance
from crime. Desistance research better accounts for selectivity
because the treatment is more often within the hands of the re-
searcher. Moreover, we have greater ethical and constitutional
license to intervene among admitted or convicted offenders and
are thus able to administer stronger treatments to target groups.
Among the challenges to learning more from desistance re-
search are devising theoretically meaningful interventions and
expanding and ensuring external validity. Our intent is not to
discourage efforts for juveniles, but simply to acknowledge that
we currently lack effective technologies for this population.
More optimistically, desistance research could offer critical tests
of existing theory, the potential for new breakthroughs, and
concrete policy guidance.
Clearly, our advocacy of desistance research is not intended
to suggest that it has yet to be undertaken. Rather the problem
is that most such efforts are seriously flawed in terms of research
design, sampling strategy, and theoretical justifications for the
interventions being assessed. 67 Such investigations may be valu-
able for the administration of correctional or social services but
are essentially without any implication for desistance theory or
policy.
On the other hand, there are several desistance-oriented in-
terventions whose evaluations have documented their content,
suggested their crime control potential and, in some cases,
specified the offenders for whom the interventions might be
' See Ted Palmer's excellent review of this literature and suggestions for future re-
search in A PROFILE OF CORREcTIONAL EFFEcTIvENEss AND NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
REsEARcH 10-21, 67-178 (1994).
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most effective. A partial list of these programs includes the Na-
tional Supported Work Demonstration,68 the Baltimore Life
Study, ' the mulftisystemic therapy program,70 and the "Fixing
Broken Windows" police intervention.7' There are also a few
studies (and specifications of theories) that imply the desistance
possibilities of yet-to-be implemented crime control interven-
tions. Among these are the recent investigations of Rosenbaum
and Popkin72 (suggesting possible desistance effects of residen-
tial change and its attendant opportunities) and Sampson and
Laub (addressing the impact of the GI Bill on the criminal be-
havior of its beneficiaries).73
That the degree of effectiveness of these interventions has
not yet been definitively established is not surprising since, with
few exceptions, they have received little systematic study follow-
ing their initial exploration. This has been particularly true of
interventions providing offenders with material assistance, train-
ing, or opportunities.74 Though the reasons for this apparent
neglect have received little discussion, two considerations seem
relevant. Such interventions are likely to be expensive and po-
litically sensitive, the latter a consequence of the potential costs
as well as the reluctance of citizens and politicians to "reward"
those who prey upon society's conventional members. Thus, if
these programs are shown to increase the probability of desis-
tance from crime among offenders, policy makers face a poten-
tial dilemma. Should they support full implementation of these
programs they may face accusations that they reward the unwor-
MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH CORP., SUMMARY AND FINDINGS OF THE
NATIONAL SUPPORTED WoRKDEMONSTRATION 133 (1980).
69 Charles Mallar & Craig Thornton, Transitional Aid for Released Prisoners: Evidence
from the LIFE Experiment, 13J. HUM. RESOURCES, Spring 1978, at 208, 233.70 SCOTT HENGGELER & CHARLES BORDUIN, FAMILYTHERAPYAND BEYOND 55 (1990).
71 GEORGE KELI G & CATHERINE COLES, FIXbNG BROKEN WINDOWS 23 (1996).
72James Rosenbaum & Susan Popkin, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF HOUSING
INTEGRATION 1 (1990).
7
' Robert Sampson &John Laub, Socioeconomic Achievement in the Life Course of Disad-
vantaged Men: Military Service as a Turning Point, Circa 1940-1965, 61 AM. SOC. REv. 347,
363 (1996).
7' More punitive interventions, such as mandatory arrest for domestic abusers,
are frequently replicated. Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deter-
rent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. SOC. REv. 261, 268 (1984).
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thy for their criminal behavior; conversely, should they oppose
implementation, they may be criticized for withholding proven
crime control measures. Given the alternatives, policy makers
may turn to the evaluation of more politically acceptable ex-
periments based on such factors as increased police manpower,
greater use of arrest, and longer prison sentences. Although
the merits of these policy measures cannot be dismissed out-of-
hand, their promise seems no greater than and their costs no
less than the desistance strategy we suggest.
The merits of a desistance strategy apply as well to the ad-
vancement of academic knowledge as they do to urgent policy
imperatives. Perhaps the most fundamental asymmetry in the
study of crime and desistance is in our ability to intervene and
thus isolate the respective causes of these phenomena. If so, de-
sistance research could further John Dewey's goal of moving so-
cial science from a "passive and accumulative" stance to an
active and productive one.75 For Dewey, as for Rubin and Hol-
land, "As far as we intentionally do and make, we shall know."7 6
" John Dewey, Social Science and Social Contro THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 29, 1931, at
276.
71 Id. at 277.
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